Traits of the Fourth-Generation leadership. Unique characteristics of the principal players, President party chief Hu, Premier Wen, and other members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee. Comparison between the beliefs and statecraft of the Hu-Wen team on the one hand, and those of former leaders including Deng, Jiang, and the late general-secretaries Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, on the other. A discussion of different approaches to pursuing economic and political reform.

President Hu’s search for the formula to enable the CCP to remain the perennial ruling party of China. Hu’s “theory of scientific socialism” and “scientific development.” This means essentially that there is nothing obsolete or inherently wrong with orthodox values such as Marxism and socialism: if the Chinese leadership can hit upon a “scientific” theory of socialist development with Chinese characteristics, the country can prosper and the CCP’s mandate of heaven will be indefinitely extended.

Analysis and discussion of the contents of the Hu-Wen team’s “scientific theory of development.” The new administration’s “putting-people-first” policies — a “reinvention” of Chairman Mao’s “serve the people” credo. Hu’s reinterpretation of ex-president Jiang’s “Theory of the Three Represents” by putting the focus on boosting the welfare of “disadvantaged sectors” of society, particularly the lowly peasants and unemployed urban workers. Hu’s call for the “construction of a harmonious society.”

Brief discussion and assessment of the Hu-Wen team’s agrarian and industrial policies. Is the Fourth-Generation leadership successful in reversing the trend, first begun by Lenin and Mao, of “squeezing the peasants in support of fast-paced industrialization in the cities”? Inchoate attempts to foster social equality. Beijing’s efforts to set up a social security system; the crisis over mushrooming education and health-case costs.

Legal, administrative and political reform. Hu’s game plan regarding the promotion of “rule by law” and the revision of the state constitution in 2004. Beijing’s efforts to update several outdated and draconian codes; why the goal of “rule of law” (as understood in the West) has remained illusory. Administrative reform, mostly expanding the pool of talent from which the leadership can pick central and local cadres; recruitment of senior officials through public examinations. “Democracy within the party.” A moratorium on township- and county-level polls.

The Hu-Wen leadership’s checkered scorecard: shortcomings in their “putting-people-first” strategy and “scientific development” theory. The gap between rich and poor has yawned wider. The level of social justice nationwide is dropping even as corruption, deemed the “cancer” of the socialist body politic, has become endemic. The disturbing growth of the “new class” of cadres-cum-businessmen: the “unholy alliance” between officials (and their offspring) and big business groups. Proliferation of “mass incidents” to close to 90,000 incidents a year. Accusations that the Hu-Wen system has bred a new stratum of the filthy rich, an “unholy alliance” between corrupt, greedy cadres and “red capitalists.” Rising political unrest in Xinjiang and Tibet has raised doubt about Beijing’s efficacy in promoting a harmonious relationship between the majority Han Chinese and ethnic minorities.

The great debate from 2005 to 2008 over the directions of “the next stage of reform.” Liberal cadres and intellectuals have criticized the Hu-Wen team for dragging their feet on reform; while “leftists” or remnant Maoists have laid into the administration’s alleged betrayal of the country’s Marxist and socialist roots. Hu’s new efforts to study Marxism and socialism — and to render them compatible with 21st century requirements.

Restrictions over the growth of the Chinese civil society. The Hu-Wen administration’s tough policies toward the media and freedom of expression in general. The socio-political orientations of the fast-rising middle and professional classes. The CCP leadership’s reaction to the “velvet revolution” in countries including Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Similarities between the worldviews of Hu and President Vladimir Putin of Russia.

Viability of the “China model”. An assessment of whether the Hu-Wen team’s theory of scientific development has measured up to expectations. Drawbacks of the China model: stagnation of real administrative and political reform; lack of progress in social equality; environmental depredation; the alarming decline in the health of peasants and workers; and so forth. The “China model” in historical and global context.

The Hu-Wen team’s worldview and their distinctive approach to foreign and security policies. Hu’s theories regarding the “peaceful rise of China” and “a policy of good neighborliness.” Background behind Beijing’s playing a bigger role in multilateral efforts such as the resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Focus on China’s relations with the following countries/blocs: the U.S., Japan, Russia, ASEAN and the European Union. China’s enhanced role in the global order following the eclipse of American power in the wake of the financial crisis of 2009-2010.

Beijing’s relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong under the Fourth-Generation leadership. Taking the historical perspective, analysis and discussion will be conducted on how President Hu has pushed forward the Taiwan and Hong Kong policies of predecessors, principally Deng and Jiang. “New” elements in Hu’s bid to stop Taiwanese independence, and to maintain peace and stability in Hong Kong.

Significance of the 17th CCP Congress and preparations for the 18th Congress (2012); personnel and policy changes; the rise of the Fifth-Generation leadership under Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. Projection of policies from the 17th to the 18th Party Congress. The impact of the 2008 Olympics on economic and political reform and on the growth of Chinese nationalism.
Recapitulation of the highlights of the Hu-Wen era. Assessment of the historical significance of political, economic and cultural developments in the period under discussion, particularly against the backdrop of the century-old saga of Chinese modernization.

Date

Topic

Presentation Groups

Mar. 5

1d

1d

1

1.     Mak Ka Hei

2.     Tong Chiu Kit

3.     Fung Chi Kong, Felix

Mar. 19

2

1.     邵羽駿, 佟芸輝

2.     金琳, 鍾源, 畢馨予

3.     Kobayashi Aya, Liang Yuli, 王源

Apr. 2

3

1.     龔帥, 王菲

2.     Knut Bolstad Jacobsen, Yang Xi, 沈顯卓

3.     Yeung Juni, Lam Hau Yu, Yang Benyao

Date

Topic

Presentation Groups

Mar. 12

1a

1b

1c

1d

1.     朱元冰, 申靜雯, 張璐

2.     張博

3.     孫馮離塵

4.     Tony Li, 胡坤杰, 張寧

Mar. 26

2

1.     毛迪, 路濱烽

2.     Ng Ka Wai

3.     Huang Shu Yu, Chen Guicheng, Zhang Jing

4.     Siu Chi Wai

Apr. 9

3

1.     Li Chun Wai, Lui Tsz Wing

2.     Liu Hun

3.     鮑慧博

4.     劉凱